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Incentives in Public Assistance: A Review of the Literature 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act  of 1996 
was passed with the intention of encouraging workforce participation, 
strengthening families, and removing incentives for long-term dependency. These 
reforms, which largely consisted of greater limitations on eligibility, appear to be 
centered within classical economic theory in which generous benefits are believed 
to encourage dependency and disincentivize work. Very little research, however, 
has established whether these new restrictions have created the intended 
incentives and changed recipient behavior. The current study seeks to provide a 
better understanding of the true incentives created by welfare reform via a review 
of relevant research. Further, the person-in-environment perspective (Barker, 2003) 
will be proposed as an alternative theoretical framework in which to analyze the 
behavior of welfare recipients. 
Literature Review 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) provides cash transfers to 
low-income families and is the program most often evoked by the term “welfare” 
in the United States. The current TANF program is an evolution (or a devolution, 
 
depending on one’s political leanings) of the New Deal–era Aid to Dependent 
Children (ADC) program. ADC gave way to Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) in 1950, with the intention of including aid to parents (Jansson, 
2014). Critics of AFDC “argued that entitlement to cash assistance and related 
benefits encouraged dependence on government aid [and] provided a disincen- 
tive to work” (Ridzi & London, 2006, p. 725). The availability of cash assistance in 
addition to Food  Stamps, Medicaid, and housing assistance may have indeed 
outweighed the low-wage, low-benefit work awaiting families who left the 
program (Cancian, Meyer, & Caspar, 2008). Further, critics worried that the 
program discouraged the formation of two-parent families if two incomes were 
still not sufficient to compensate for the loss of benefits. 
These criticisms paved the way for passage of the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA, 1996) in which AFDC 
was replaced by TANF with the intention of “ending welfare as we know it” 
(Jansson, 2014). The act’s main purposes (enumerated below) are explicit. 
The purpose of this part is to increase the flexibility of states in operating a 
program designed to 
1. Provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their
own homes or in the homes of relatives.
2. End the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting
job preparation, work, and marriage.
3. Prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish
annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these
pregnancies.
4. Encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families (42 USC § 601).
To meet these goals, the new program implemented a five-year lifetime limit 
and required that all recipients work or engage in work-related activities. While 
AFDC was an  entitlement program (meaning that  any  applicant  meeting 
eligibility criteria was entitled to benefits), TANF became a block grant to states, 
with incentives for increasing employment and marriage (Ridzi & London, 2006). 
While  the  intended  incentives  of  TANF  appear  to  be  based  in  a  classical 
economic model of rationality (i.e., generous benefits encourage dependency and 
restrictive benefits encourage independence), social workers have long advocated 
for a person-in-environment perspective when analyzing human service delivery 
(Barker, 2003). This perspective argues that individual choices must be understood 
within the environmental context of one’s family, community, and larger economic 
and policy structures. It also requires that human service delivery take into account 
the client’s personal experiences and abilities. For example, gainful employment 
may be difficult to maintain for a client with insufficient education, disabilities, 
domestic abuse, or caregiving responsibilities. These challenges might be exacer- 
bated by economic conditions such as a recession. This orientation lends itself to a 
more nuanced understanding of individual behavior in public assistance programs. 
A great deal of research has evaluated macro-level outcomes for the TANF 
program, but few studies have investigated decision making on the individual 
 
level, as advocated by the person-in-environment perspective. The current study 
attempts to aggregate the existent research and provide a better understanding of 
the actual incentives created for TANF recipients within the relevant (see 
Methodology) literature. 
Methodology 
The primary author and a graduate assistant utilized three search engines 
(Academic One File, JSTOR, and Academic Search Complete) to identify peer- 
reviewed, empirical articles including the terms “incentive” and “Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families” in all text. This search resulted in  817  articles across 
the three search engines. Articles  written before 1996 or outside of the United 
States were then eliminated. These two criteria aided in identifying articles whose 
primary aim was to analyze the American TANF program, which was first 
initiated in 1996. Some articles met the above criteria, but the author’s discussion 
of incentives was not a direct result of the article’s empirical findings. Such articles 
were also eliminated. This process resulted in a total of 12 articles that were 
appropriate for the purposes of this review (see the appendix). 
A qualitative content analysis (Hsiu-Fang Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) was used 
to analyze themes related to incentives in the TANF program. Data collection and 
analysis involved a constructivist (Rodwell, 1998), qualitative design. Constructive 
research is proposed as an alternative to traditional, positivist inquiry. Positivists 
assume that there exists an absolute reality, and the researcher is in pursuit of 
absolute truth. Constructivism argues that even if such an absolute reality did 
exist, the limitations of human understanding make such knowledge unattainable 
(Rodwell, 1998). For example, the process of determining whether an article does 
or does not make inferences regarding incentives is inherently biased by the 
researcher’s personal perspective. 
To improve trustworthiness, both researchers independently coded each 
article’s conclusions regarding incentives. Emergent themes (Charmaz, 2006) were 
independently identified, also known as open coding (Berg & Lune, 2011). These 
themes were then compared for inter-rater reliability. While few differences 
emerged between reviewers, these were negotiated through discussion. Finally, 
axial coding was employed to establish larger themes emerging from the research 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This process revealed three themes that are closely related 
to TANF’s intended outcomes of work, family formation, and indepen- dence, 
but in ways that may be surprising. See Table 1 for a summary of these findings. 
Findings 
Work 
Regarding work, four of the studies (Cancian, Meyer, & Wu, 2005; Connolly 
&  Marston,  2005;  Larrison,  Nackerud,  &  Risler,  2001;  Seefeldt  &  Orzol,  2005) 
 
Table 1.  Summary of Findings 
Theme More Successful Changes Less Successful Changes 
Work • States with generous work require- 
ments (more work exemptions, fewer 
required working hours, etc.) see 
higher wages and more health benefits 
for TANF leavers (Lim, Coulton, & 
Lalich, 2009) 
Family • Diversion payments reduce abortion
rates (Snarr & Edwards, 2009) 
• TANF work requirements less success- 
ful in moving those without a high 
school education to work than AFDC 
(Cancian, Meyer, & Wu, 2005; Con- 
nolly & Marston, 2005) 
• Family caps not associated with changes 
in recipient birth rates (Wallace, 2009) 
• Requiring teen parents to live with a 
guardian and attend school associated 
with fewer subsequent births (Lopoo 
& DeLeire, 2006) 
• Passing child support payments on to 
mothers associated with faster paternity 
establishment and higher rates of pay- 
ment (Cancian, Meyer, & Caspar, 2008) 
• TANF restrictions discourage mar- 
riage (Cherlin & Fomby, 2004) 
• Reduced TANF payments are associ- 
ated with increased foster care case- 
loads (Swann & Sylvester, 2006) 
Independence • Onerous application process creates 
deterrent for otherwise eligible fami- 
lies and increased utilization of other 
programs (Cancian et al., 2005; Ridzi 
& London, 2006) 
discussed the need for TANF work requirements to better account for personal 
and educational barriers. For example, Connolly and Marston (2005) and Cancian 
et al. (2005) both discovered that post-1996 TANF work requirements were more 
effective in moving high school graduates to employment than those without a 
diploma. Connolly and Marston (2005) found that educational supports in the 
pre-TANF Aid to Families with Dependent Children program were much more 
effective in moving recipients who had not yet finished high school to eventual 
independence. 
Seefeldt and Orzol (2005) and Larrison et al. (2001) both described the 
multiple and overlapping personal barriers among some recipients that  made work 
requirements and time limits impractical. These barriers include “persistent 
maternal and child health problems, persistent domestic violence, lack of a 
partner, low levels of education and increases in the number of children” 
(Seefeldt & Orzol, 2005, p. 226). Larrison et al.  (2001) suggest that reforms in 
Social Security Disability Insurance could better serve many TANF families who 
face multiple physical and mental health barriers. 
Further, states with the most generous work requirements experienced higher 
rates of long-term success among recipients (Connolly & Marston, 2005; Lim, 
Coulton, & Lalich, 2009). TANF families in states that granted more work 
exemptions, had fewer required work hours, and had lower financial sanctions 
left TANF with higher wages and were more likely to find a job with employer- 
provided health care than recipients in states with more stringent requirements 
 
(Lim et al., 2009). The authors suggest that lenient work requirements may give 
recipients more time to look for high-quality employment and result in greater 
long-term success than the national population of TANF leavers, who often find 
low-quality jobs. 
Family 
TANF incentives are also related to  family connectedness  and family 
planning. For example, Snarr and Edwards (2009) found that diversion payments 
(lump sums in lieu of TANF) are associated with reduced rates of abortion among 
low-income single mothers. Some states have attempted to limit childbearing 
among TANF mothers “by denying additional cash assistance to recipients who 
have children while on welfare” (Wallace, 2009, p. 73), also known as family caps. 
These caps do not appear to have achieved the desired effect, as they are unrelated 
to changes in birth rates among recipients (Wallace, 2009). Conversely, post-1996 
rules requiring teen parents to live with a guardian and attend school are 
associated with decreased teen birth rates (Lopoo & DeLeire, 2006). 
Welfare rules are further influential in connectedness among the adults in a 
family. While some state TANF agencies retain child support payments for 
administrative costs, those passing the payments on to the mother and child 
experience faster paternity establishment and higher rates of payment (Cancian 
et al., 2008). TANF receipt also appears to influence a mother’s decision to marry, 
but not necessarily to cohabitate (Cherlin & Fomby, 2004). The authors postulate 
that marriage is likely a financial decision for a mother, and she must weigh 
whether a potential partner has sufficient income stability to risk the loss of 
assistance. 
Finally, post-1996 public assistance appears to have created a ripple effect in 
the child welfare system. Reduced TANF payments are associated with increased 
foster care caseloads, possibly due to increased family strain and maltreatment 
(Swann & Sylvester, 2006). In addition, relative caregivers are more likely to become 
formally involved with child welfare (in order to access foster care funds) when 
TANF payments are unavailable (Swann & Sylvester, 2006). 
Independence 
The final emergent theme is related to the program’s stated goal of increased 
financial independence. The examined literature suggests that reductions in 
TANF caseloads (independence from the program) may not be synonymous with 
total financial independence. For example, two studies (Cancian et al., 2005; Ridzi 
& London, 2006) discovered that an onerous application process was creating an 
unintended deterrent for otherwise eligible families. Restrictive TANF work 
requirements were also related to increased utilization of other programs, such as 
Food Stamps (Cancian et al., 2005). In other words, families in need were not 
necessarily “rehabilitated” by TANF, but instead diverted to other  sources  of help. 
 
Discussion 
The methodology of this study presents multiple limitations. Primarily, 
restricting the sample to those articles that used the term “incentive” may have 
eliminated appropriate literature that employed synonyms to “incentive.” 
However, including other terms may have created an unmanageable sample size 
for the qualitative design. Further, this study only examined articles related to 
one specific program (TANF). There are several other programs such as Disability 
Insurance, Unemployment Insurance, and the Earned Income Tax  Credit  that have 
been similarly criticized for incentivizing dependency. Future research ought to 
employ a similar methodology with these programs. Still, the use of a systematic 
search process and the use of transparent, reproducible analysis methods are 
significant strengths of this work. 
The research described here suggests that the intended incentives of the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 may 
have been based  in a whole or partial misunderstanding of personal decision 
making in regard to work, family, and independence. For example, a woman’s 
decision to  have children  appears to be unrelated to TANF  benefits (Wallace, 
2009). Further, as noted by Cherlin and Fomby (2004), a recipient’s decision to 
marry may be influenced by larger economic structures, such as the availability of 
well-paid work for a potential spouse. A systematic review of welfare-to-work 
programs in the United States similarly found that outcomes for TANF recipients 
were only slightly more positive than those in a comparison group (Smedslund 
et al., 2006). 
Among the examined literature, the most successful programs appear to be 
those that operate from a person-in-environment perspective (Barker, 2003). Those 
programs that supported a pregnant mother’s short-term financial needs (Snarr & 
Edwards, 2009), provided greater flexibility for job seekers (Connolly & Marston, 
2005; Lim et al., 2009), allowed fathers to support their children (Cancian et al., 
2008), and required teen mothers to live with a guardian (Lopoo & DeLeire, 2006) 
experienced the most positive outcomes among recipients. Further, several of the 
studies discussed the need for the TANF program to better understand the 
complex lives of welfare applicants. 
These personal perspectives can be difficult to understand when programs 
such as TANF are studied solely in large-scale quantitative approaches. This is 
particularly apparent in studies such as Snarr and Edwards  (2009),  who discovered 
complex results when analyzing countrywide data over the course of 13 years 
(1990–2003). They find that “diversion payments to low-income mothers lower 
abortion incidence” (p. 575). Conversely, they also report that the combined 
availability of diversion payments and TANF eligibility increased abortion rates 
among childless women (Snarr & Edwards, 2009). These results became further 
complicated by the particular trimester of pregnancy during which women 
applied for assistance. The lives and decisions of these women (and all of the 
recipients described here) would be better understood with a mixed methodologi- 
cal design that includes smaller-scale, qualitative inquiry. 
 
Previous research further supports the notion that overly simplistic beliefs 
regarding disincentives for independence created by generous public assistance 
are counterproductive. Nam (2008), for example, discovered that increased 
eligibility (via maximum allowable financial assets) in the TANF program was 
associated with increased savings rates among all low-income families, not just 
those receiving assistance. When low-income families save, they are able to build 
their own financial safety net and become less dependent upon public assistance 
over time (Sherraden, 1991). This suggests that restrictive eligibility might actually 
create disincentives for independence when a family fears that any small increase 
in assets might make them ineligible for assistance but would not be enough to 
sustain them through a major emergency (job loss, etc.). Hamilton, Alexander- 
Eitzman, and Royal (2015) confirm that increases in allowable financial assets do 
not appear to be associated with greater utilization of public assistance. It is 
therefore proposed that TANF policies that create greater flexibility for individual 
circumstances and fewer eligibility restrictions will likely be more effective in 
creating stable, self-sufficient American families. 
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